Defending Against Harmful Supervision Hidden in Benign Samples

精选理由

这篇论文揭示了有害微调的新方式,提出Embedded Attack和DR-SFT,对AI安全研究者很有启发。

AI 摘要

论文提出Embedded Attack,将有害的问答对嵌入良性训练样本中,测试表明代表性防护机制在样本级别难以检测。为应对这一威胁,作者提出双参考SFT(DR-SFT),通过词元级正则化将DPO风格的对比目标适配到SFT,在粗粒度数据过滤之外缓解有害微调。实验证明该攻击能绕过现有防御,而DR-SFT可有效降低有害行为。

原文 · arXiv cs.AI

Existing defenses are effective when harmful content is explicitly mixed into downstream fine-tuning data, but crafted samples can instead hide harmful supervision inside benign tasks. We propose Embedded Attack, where harmful QA pairs are embedded within benign training samples, and show that representative guardrails often fail to detect them at the example level. To address this, we propose Dual-Reference SFT (DR-SFT), which adapts DPO-style contrastive objective design to SFT through token-level regularization, mitigating harmful fine-tuning beyond coarse data filtering.