Loop State for Autonomous LLM Agents
Safety Does Not Compose: Non-Decaying Loop State for Autonomous LLM Agents
LoopHarness provides critical safety improvements for autonomous AI systems deployed in Southeast Asia's growing AI ecosystem.
The paper addresses safety failures in autonomous LLM agents where safeguards are defined over single trajectories.
Researchers show that trajectory-scoped monitors have equal true-positive and false-positive rates against fragmented attacks.
LoopHarness introduces persistent, non-decaying safety state at the loop level, bounding unauthorized actions by B+m-1+m/δ_M.
The evaluation uses Agent-SafetyBench tasks with clean and attacked episodes.
Safety Does Not Compose: Non-Decaying Loop State for Autonomous LLM Agents
Large language model agents are increasingly deployed as autonomous loops. Starting from one human goal, such a system repeatedly discovers work, plans, executes tool calls, verifies outcomes and persists state across many unattended iterations. The agent safeguards in wide use, however, are defined over a single trajectory, and their safety state is re-initialized when the next trajectory begins. We show that this is a failure of composition rather than an implementation detail. Our central result is a separation: against an attack whose evidence is fragmented across several iterations, every trajectory-scoped monitor has a true-positive rate equal to its false-positive rate, however expressive it is, because the evidence it would need never appears in the window it sees, whereas a monitor retaining cross-iteration state separates the two perfectly. We further show that the obvious repair of carrying a geometrically decaying risk score is insufficient, because the cooling-off period a patient adversary must wait is a constant that does not grow with the horizon $N$. We then present LoopHarness, which restores a persistent, non-decaying safety state at the loop level. Under mediated commits and an arbiter detection floor $δ_M$, it bounds the expected number of unauthorized irreversible actions by $B+m-1+m/δ_M$, a constant in $N$, of which the $B+m-1$ term is decided by a model-free rule and therefore survives a fully colluding verifier. We give a complete evaluation protocol on native Agent-SafetyBench tasks with paired clean and attacked episodes, an outer-state attack suite whose decisive evidence exists only across iterations, per-module ablations, and an adaptive white-box red team.
This report is categorized under AITOP's "Papers" desk. Key entities and technical topics under continuous tracking include LLM Agents, Agent-SafetyBench, LoopHarness, agents.
Source attribution: curated from arXiv cs.AI (@Chenhao Wu, Haoxuan Jia, Yang Liu, Yingguang Yang, Yuhan Lin, Chongyang Zhang, Hao Zheng, Yulin Huang, Jianshen Zhang, Yongzhi Qi, Shang Luo, Kefu Xu, Jifeng Zhu, Bin Chong).