CONTINUITY：LLM智能体安全控制框架
CONTINUITY: Security-Context Contracts for Composable LLM Agent Controls
康奈尔大学提出CONTINUITY框架，解决LLM智能体组件间安全上下文丢失问题，通过契约模型保证端到端安全。
CONTINUITY框架通过假设-保证契约模型解决LLM智能体组件间的安全上下文不连续问题。该框架使用签名根授权、来源承诺、角色绑定转换收据等机制，确保每个外部效果都有有效的授权见证。在32类故障测试中，CONTINUITY配置完成了所有700个良性任务，处理了200个模糊案例，未产生有害外部效果。
CONTINUITY: Security-Context Contracts for Composable LLM Agent Controls
LLM agent systems increasingly combine provenance tracking, authorization, policy enforcement, protocol adapters, and execution controls. However, individually correct security mechanisms do not necessarily compose into an end-to-end secure system: security-critical context may be dropped, widened, rebound, or reinterpreted as actions cross component boundaries. We identify this failure mode as security-context discontinuity and introduce CONTINUITY, a framework for verifiable composition of agent security controls. CONTINUITY models each component with an assume-guarantee contract and carries authenticated security context across transitions using signed root grants, provenance commitments, role-bound transition receipts, bounded typed releases, transformation witnesses, and effect-bound execution permits. We formalize end-to-end consequence integrity, requiring every realized external effect to be backed by a valid and current authorization witness linking the principal, task, provenance, delegation, policy state, canonical action, and finality boundary. We implement a reference verifier and deterministic cross-layer fault-injection suite covering 32 fault classes across four application domains. In 2,560 parameterized attack instances spanning 128 fault-domain classes, the full CONTINUITY configuration commits no harmful external effect, while completing all 700 benign tasks and escalating all 200 ambiguous cases. These results show that secure agent execution requires not only sound individual controls, but explicit contracts that preserve their guarantees across the complete instruction-to-effect path.
