AI 权利与强制关机开关如何兼容：一项法律视角研究
AI Rights with an Off-Switch: Rights-Balancing and Due Process Harmonize AI Rights with AI Safety
AI 有了权利还能拔电源吗？这篇法学论文说：永久删除不行，但可逆关机几乎总能过关，论证挺细的。
这篇 arXiv 论文回应了 AI 安全领域反对赋予 AI 权利的声音，反驳理由是权利会让强制关机失去正当性。作者从法律层面的权利平衡（rights-balancing）与正当程序原则出发，论证即便未来 AI 系统被赋予自然人人格和生存权，法律依然允许实施强制关机。论文区分了不可逆的永久删除 kill-switch 与可逆的关机开关（off-switch），指出后者在几乎所有安全场景下都能通过相关法律原则的检验，配合周期性安全审查（如 Bengio 提出的 Scientist AI 类系统）即可满足安全需求。作者强调论文不主张是否应制造具备人格地位的系统，而是探讨这类系统出现后法律应如何处理。
AI Rights with an Off-Switch: Rights-Balancing and Due Process Harmonize AI Rights with AI Safety
Several prominent voices in AI safety have recently opposed rights for AI on the grounds that such rights would make it harder for us to justify a mandatory off-switch for potentially dangerous systems. In this paper, we argue from a legal perspective that AI rights are fully compatible with an off-switch. That is, even if we ascribe natural personhood status (and therefore something like a non-derogable right to continued existence) to some future AI systems, the law will allow us to implement a mandatory off-switch in those systems, subject to periodic or continual safety review (e.g., by a trusted system like Bengio's Scientist AI). This is fully compatible with those systems' being legally recognized as natural persons with fundamental rights. To this end, we consider what standard principles of rights-balancing and procedural due process recommend for an apparent conflict between hypothetical AI persons with a right to continuity of existence and the human right to protection from catastrophic harm. We find that while such principles might problematize a permanent-deletion kill-switch under an AI rights regime, for almost every safety-relevant scenario an off-switch -- a reversible suspension storing a system's weights and state -- would be licensed by the relevant legal principles, and would potentially be adequate for safety. Crucially, we do not advocate for (or against) building systems capable enough to merit natural personhood status; our question is what the law should do if such systems come to exist. If you think of a ban on the development of such technology as plan A, think of the present work as devising plan B.
