云端-边缘-物联网系统中可信分布式机器学习安全综述
Trustworthy Distributed Machine Learning in Cloud-Edge-IoT Systems: A Heterogeneity-Aware Survey of Security, Privacy, and Robustness
这篇 arXiv 综述把联邦学习安全从攻击面到防御手段整理成一张完整地图,做分布式训练安全方向的话可以当参考手册用。
arXiv 论文系统梳理分布式机器学习(DML)的安全、隐私与鲁棒性问题,将联邦学习(FL)作为高风险重点案例。综述分析了统计、系统与信任三类异构性(non-IID 数据、资源不对称、间歇参与、cross-silo/cross-device 信任差异)如何影响收敛、公平性与攻击可检测性。论文覆盖投毒、后门、拜占庭攻击、隐私泄露、模型提取、Sybil 行为等攻击面,并比较鲁棒聚合、差分隐私、同态加密、安全多方计算、可信执行环境等分层防御。最后给出部署与评估指南,强调可复现的 non-IID 划分、攻击感知基准、隐私预算、攻击成功率与能耗/碳开销等指标。
Trustworthy Distributed Machine Learning in Cloud-Edge-IoT Systems: A Heterogeneity-Aware Survey of Security, Privacy, and Robustness
Distributed machine learning (DML), including conventional distributed training and federated learning (FL), enables collaborative model development across cloud-edge-IoT systems without fully centralizing raw data. However, distributing data, computation, updates, and orchestration increases the attack surface and introduces coupled challenges across privacy, robustness, reliability, fairness, and governance. This survey presents a security-centered, heterogeneity-aware roadmap for trustworthy DML, with FL treated as a prominent high-risk case. We first characterize the assets, adversaries, trust assumptions, and coordination patterns that define DML/FL security boundaries. We then analyze how statistical, system, and trust heterogeneity, including non-IID data, resource asymmetry, intermittent participation, and cross-silo/cross-device trust differences, affect convergence, fairness, attack detectability, and defense reliability. Next, we synthesize attack-defense interactions across poisoning, backdoors, Byzantine manipulation, privacy leakage, model extraction, network/orchestration attacks, Sybil behavior, and strategic participation. We further compare layered defenses, including robust aggregation, drift-aware optimization, differential privacy, secure aggregation, homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, trusted execution environments, watermarking, provenance, authenticated communication, and monitoring. Finally, we discuss deployment, evaluation, governance, and open research guidelines, emphasizing reproducible, non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID) partitions, attack-aware benchmarks, privacy budgets, attack success rate, client-level disparity, latency, communication, memory, energy/carbon overhead, and auditable lifecycle artifacts.