TRIAGE-CPG:8个LLM在静态恶意软件分诊任务上的跨模型评测
TRIAGE-CPG: A Cross-Model Study of Budgeted Static Malware Triage with Large Language Models
做安全分诊的团队应该看看这篇:它把恶意软件分析拆成Agent按预算读函数的流程,用8个模型在1000个PE文件上跑同一协议,量化了各家在漏报和误报之间的取舍。结论对选型很实用——开源和闭源模型表现重叠,没有哪个配置通吃。
一篇arXiv论文提出TRIAGE-CPG,把静态恶意软件分诊建模为预算受限的证据获取问题,在反编译二进制的代码属性图(CPG)上运行固定流程:启发式选种子函数、Agent按预算扩充证据、最后输出良性/可疑/恶意三分类判定和行为报告。
评测覆盖8个闭源和开放权重模型,基于1,000个Windows PE二进制文件,使用600个样本的测试集和统一的零shot协议。每模型平均分析1,000个函数中的约40个后,最高分模型达到0.805的严格平衡准确率和0.855的分诊平衡准确率(tBA),其中65%的恶意软件被标记、12%被上报、94%的良性样本被正确放行。
研究发现不同模型采取的策略差异明显:高特异性的模型生成的上报队列小而恶意软件密度高,召回导向的模型则更广泛地标记或上报,闭源与开源模型均分布在这一光谱两端。结论是没有通用的部署配置,模型选择本身决定了有限静态证据下的放行/标记/上报权衡。
TRIAGE-CPG: A Cross-Model Study of Budgeted Static Malware Triage with Large Language Models
When triaging unknown binaries, security analysts must decide which samples to clear as benign, flag as malicious, or escalate for deeper analysis. Large Language Models (LLMs) could support these decisions by interpreting decompiled code, but a binary can contain hundreds or thousands of functions, making exhaustive LLM analysis impractical. We study how current LLMs behave when static triage is formulated as budgeted evidence acquisition: which functions they inspect and how they trade off benign clearance, malware detection, and escalation. To enable a controlled comparison, we implement TRIAGE-CPG, a fixed pipeline over a code property graph (CPG) of a decompiled binary. An LLM-free heuristic selects seed functions, an agent expands the resulting evidence dossier under a fixed budget, and a reporting stage produces a benign, suspicious, or malicious verdict together with a behavioral report. We evaluate eight closed-source and open-weight models on 1,000 Windows PE binaries, using a 600-sample test split and the same zero-shot protocol for every model. We assess the ternary verdicts under both a strict binary reading and triage balanced accuracy (tBA), which credits malware that is flagged or escalated and benign samples only when cleared. After analyzing about 40 of a mean 1,000 functions per binary, the highest-scoring model reaches a strict balanced accuracy of 0.805 and a tBA of 0.855, flagging 65% of malware, escalating another 12%, and clearing 94% of benign samples. The models implement different triage policies: high-specificity models produce small, malware-rich escalation queues, whereas recall-oriented models escalate or flag much more broadly. Both closed-source and open-weight models appear across this spectrum. Our results identify no universal deployment configuration: model choice itself determines the clear/flag/escalate trade-off under limited static evidence.
This report is categorized under AITOP's "Papers" desk. Within our cross-regional analytical framework, it directly maps to AI developer toolchains, coding agents, and engineering workflows. Key entities and technical topics under continuous tracking include LLM, malware detection, TRIAGE-CPG, static analysis.
Source attribution: curated from arXiv cs.AI (@Paul-Andrei Sava, Alexander Küchler, Daniel Kowatsch, Bernhard Grill, Jennifer Pullman, Yanick Fratantonio, Luca Invernizzi).