围绕Kimi模型实力和开源政治,这场争论把开放权重模型的利弊掰开了说,观点对撞很精彩。
Dean W. Ball认为开放权重模型本质上属于“减速主义”,会阻碍AI资本投入,并推测中国允许开源其实75%源于战略盲目,25%源于美国出口管制导致算力不足。@omarsar0反驳称这种观点荒谬,并用Taco公司类比讽刺其逻辑。他引用Tim Sweeney的比喻:若卷饼公司高管对新型卷饼发表类似言论会很可笑。Ball承认Kimi在2026年Q1的智能体编程任务中表现与顶尖模型相当,但不认为其运行成本真的很低。
"Open-weight models are inherently decelerationist." Among the most absurd things I have read on X ...
"Open-weight models are inherently decelerationist." Among the most absurd things I have read on X recently. "Only we should build AI, and you shouldn't" is a dangerous movement and a huge scam we should be calling out. @TimSweeneyEpic describes it best in his reply: "Picture an executive a taco company saying this sort of thing about a new brand of tacos coming onto the market, speculating about the geopolitical and societal disruptions they anticipate as a result of advances in tacos." I am also convinced these people don't actually use open models seriously or even try to understand their value. If you care about AI sovereignty, you would know how bad the argument is. I have never heard about this person before, but I was surprised to see such a statement given where they work. The reaction to the original post says it all. Dean W. Ball @deanwball Some observations on Kimi: 1. It's a very good model! I don't think its performance can be explained away by distillation or anything like that. In agentic coding sessions, it seems pretty much on par with the best public models of Q1 2026. In my fairly limited use, it also seemed very token hungry. It's not obvious to me that this model is actually that cheap to run. 2. I am personally surprised the Chinese state continues to allow the open sourcing of models this good, given potential risks. To be clear, I *myself* might be fine with models presenting this level of marginal risk being open weight, but I am surprised that China is fine with it. I suspect the reason they are is 75% explained by strategic blindness/lack of AGI-pilledness (the CCP is very Yann Lecun-y in its views of AI). The other 25% or so is their lack of compute for customer inference (making China's open-weight strategy an unintended byproduct of US export controls) and the normal Chinese strategy of aggressive exports. For the companies, as opposed to the government, the decision to open source is partially ideological and partially because they are behind, and they know that very few people would pay for sub-frontier models from China. 3. Open-weight models are inherently decelerationist, and I'm continually surprised to see the so-called "accelerationists" so excited about open-weight models. I suspect the reason they are is that they know open-weight models are effectively ungovernable, and they simply like the overall cloak of ungovernability open-weight models create over the whole of AI. It's not a bad strategy; it reminds me of James Scott's recounting of the hill people in "the art of not being governed." Still, in the end, open-weight models deter further AI capex. 4. One probable outcome of an open-weight-model-dominant world is full AI communism, which is precisely what China proposes: rather than a market product, AI is a "public good" which will ultimately be provided by the state as a kind of "digital public infrastructure." This future strikes me as a dystopian hellscape, but I've never met an open-weight models advocate who doesn't ultimately concede this is where things end. You'd be surprised how many 'accelerationists' lobbied me, while I was in government, to support an eleven or twelve-figure federally funded data center so that startups could train models at a subsidy and then give them away for free. There was no other way for AI to progress, they said. Perhaps this is the logical end state of things. Nonetheless, I find myself surprised to see supposed accelerationists excited about such an outcome. I think many of them just don't know what they're doing. Many accelerationists do not view the creation and serving of frontier models as a legitimate business. 5. I would guess that the Trump Administration will at some point realize that their best strategy here would be to create large amounts of regulatory risk around the use of open-weight Chinese models. You don't need to "ban open source" (one of the dumber motifs of AI policy discussion). You just need to direct every agency to issue soft law that creates FUD. "A Federal Reserve Advisory Bulletin found that there may be backdoors in Chinese AI models." It needn't be that well justified. You just create enough regulatory risk that every regulated enterprise backs off. You probably don't want to create so much regulatory risk that you scare off the hyperscalers from serving Chinese models; this will just drive startups to sketchier providers. There's a happy middle ground here. I'd assume they will do some version of this. 6. It's probably true that open-weight models of this capability make the world a bit more dangerous, but not so much more that you'll really notice. At some point the models will be capable enough that you will notice. "A nonliving, invisible, dangerous, and infinitely self-replicating agent escaped from a Chinese lab," you say? Color me shocked. 🔗 View Quoted Tweet 💬 9 🔄 0 ❤️ 26 👀 2798 📊 8 ⚡