论文精选85°

JAW框架揭示AI工作流劫持风险:GitHub Actions和n8n受影响

Comment and Control: Hijacking Agentic Workflows via Context-Grounded Evolution

精选理由

这是首个系统研究AI工作流安全风险的工作,使用GitHub Actions或n8n的开发者应立刻检查自己的工作流是否暴露在类似攻击下,建议点开了解具体攻击路径和防护建议。

AI 摘要

研究人员设计了首个检测与利用框架JAW,针对GitHub Actions和n8n等自动化平台中的智能体工作流进行劫持攻击。攻击者可通过操控GitHub Issue评论等输入,诱导LLM代理执行凭证泄露、任意命令等恶意操作。JAW通过静态路径可行性分析、动态提示来源分析和运行时能力分析,成功劫持了4714个GitHub工作流和8个n8n模板。受影响组件包括Claude Code、Gemini CLI、Qwen CLI、Cursor CLI等15个广泛使用的GitHub Actions及两个n8n官方节点。研究人员已向GitHub、Google、Anthropic等厂商负责任披露,并获得致谢、修复和漏洞赏金。

原文 · arXiv: Anthropic

Comment and Control: Hijacking Agentic Workflows via Context-Grounded Evolution

Automation platforms such as GitHub Actions and n8n are increasingly adopting so-called agentic workflows, which integrate Large Language Model (LLM) agents for tasks such as code review and data synchronization. While bringing convenience for developers, this integration exposes a new risk: An adversary may control and craft certain inputs, such as GitHub issue comments, to manipulate the LLM agent for unwanted actions, such as credential exfiltration and arbitrary command execution. To our knowledge, no prior academic work has studied such a risk in agentic workflows. In this paper, we design the first detection and exploitation framework, called JAW, to hijack agentic workflows hosted on automation platforms via a novel approach called Context-Grounded Evolution. Our key idea is to evolve agentic workflow inputs under the contexts derived from hybrid program analysis for hijacking purposes. Specifically, JAW generates agentic workflow contexts through three analyses: (i) static path-feasibility analysis to identify feasible agent-invocation paths and the input constraints required to trigger them, (ii) dynamic prompt-provenance analysis to determine how that input is transformed and embedded into the LLM context, and (iii) capability analysis to identify the actions and restrictions available to the agent at runtime. Our evaluation of JAW on GitHub workflows and n8n templates showed that 4714 GitHub workflows and eight n8n templates can be successfully hijacked, for example, to leak user credentials. Our findings span 15 widely-used GitHub Actions, including official GitHub Actions for Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Qwen CLI, and Cursor CLI, and two official n8n nodes. We responsibly disclosed all findings to the affected vendors and received many acknowledgements, fixes, and bug bounties, notably from GitHub, Google, and Anthropic.